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Bertosa: Review of "The Men Who Lost Singapore" by Ronald McCrum

Book Reviews
Ronald McCrum. The Men Who Lost Singapore, 1938-1942.
Singapore: NUS Press, 2017. Pp. xvi + 265.
Just after midnight on 8 December 1941, Japanese troops came
ashore at Kota Bharu, on the east coast of Malaya, in one of the
opening moves of the Second World War in the Pacific.1 Two days
later, Japanese aircraft sent the Royal Navy’s capital ships Prince of
Wales and Repulse to the bottom of the South China Sea, effectively
ending the navy’s ability to prevent further landings down the coast.
Allied air assets in the region were destroyed so quickly that the
Japanese had air superiority by the end of the first week of the
campaign. Fighting their way down both sides of peninsular Malaya,
often by leapfrogging ahead of the retreating ground forces by sea,
the disciplined and aggressive Japanese invaders made short work of
the inexperienced British, Australian, Indian, and Malay defenders.
By the end of January 1942, the entire Malay peninsula was in
Japanese hands, with only the narrow Johore Strait separating them
from the island of Singapore. Japanese landings commenced on 8
February, and by the evening of the fifteenth it was all over. The
entire campaign lasted seventy days, surprising even the Japanese,
who had estimated it would take one hundred.
Referred to by no less a personage than Winston Churchill as
“the worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history,”2 the
fall of Singapore has spawned an enormous literature, as colossal

1  
The attack on Pearl Harbor commenced shortly afterwards. Due to the International
Date Line, the date was 7 December in Hawaii.
2  
Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Abridged Edition, With an Epilogue
on the Years 1945 to 1957 (London: Cassell, 1959), 518.
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military defeats usually do.3 Very few books, however, “examine in
detail the role and the responsibilities of the colonial government
both in the lead-up to the war and during it” (from the prologue,
p. x), but that is precisely what Ronald McCrum, a retired British
Army colonel with service in postwar Malaysia and Singapore,4 sets
out to do in The Men Who Lost Singapore, 1938-1942. The fruit
of extensive documentary research in archives on both sides of the
world, the portraits of the civilian leadership painted here reveal a
group of men extraordinary for their mediocrity. For example, C.A.
Vlieland, a senior member of the Malayan Civil Service appointed
in 1938 as Secretary for Defence, Malaya—and tasked, moreover,
with a study of emergency food supplies—thought that it would
be better to have no military reinforcements sent to the region due
to the difficulty in feeding them. Alfred Duff Cooper, assigned to
Singapore as Minister Resident in September 1941, had been a failure
as Minister of Information in Churchill’s cabinet. Receiving little
cooperation from local authorities resentful of this intrusion into their
affairs, his appointment was terminated the following January. As
for the governor, Sir Shenton Thomas, the picture emerges of an
unimaginative administrator who stuck to his instructions from the
Colonial Office to maintain the production of rubber and tin at all
costs. His “renunciation of reality” (p. 160) in the face of rapidly
approaching defeat went as far as to refuse to release civilian labour
for the construction of defensive works because it would be “bad for
the morale of the population” (p. 10). With a cast of characters such
as this, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the administration
of the Far East functioned for London, at least in part, as a dumping
ground for second-rate talent.

3  
In addition to Churchill’s Second World War and the titles cited below, any overview
should include the relevant volume of the official history: S. Woodburn Kirby et al.,
The War Against Japan, vol. 1, The Loss of Singapore (London: H.M. Stationery
Office, 1957). The works of Louis Allen, a Japanese-speaking intelligence officer
during the war, should not be ignored: see his Singapore 1941-1942 (London: DavisPoynter, 1977). The most prolific author in this field today would probably have to
be Brian P. Farrell, professor of history at the National University of Singapore; most
recently, see his co-edited work with Sandy Hunter, A Great Betrayal? The Fall of
Singapore Revisited (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2010).
4  
“Five Minutes with Ronald McCrum,” News, NUS Press, 24 February 2017,
https://nuspress.nus.edu.sg/blogs/news/five-minutes-with-ronald-mccrum.
The
book itself, oddly enough, does not provide this information, describing the author
on the back cover simply as a retired British Army officer.

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol28/iss2/3
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The quality of the military leadership in theatre serves, if
anything, to strengthen this impression. The Commander-in-Chief,
Far East Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham,
returned to active service in 1939 at the age of sixty-one after serving
two years as governor of Kenya. Described by McCrum as “elderly,”
“old-fashioned,” and “unsure” (p. 70), he was replaced in December
1941 after little more than a year in the position.5 LieutenantGeneral Arthur Percival, General Officer Commanding Malaya,
had commanded nothing larger than a division prior to receiving
his appointment in March 1941.6 Unprepossessing in appearance and
described as “not a leader” by Duff Cooper,7 his greatest failing was
arguably his steadfast refusal, despite the impassioned pleas of his
Chief Engineer, to allow fortifications to be built on the north shore
of Singapore Island because, in his words (echoing the thinking of
Governor Thomas), “defences are bad for morale—for both troops
and civilians.”8 But the most controversial figure among the Allied
leadership is probably Major-General Gordon Bennett, commander of
the 8th Australian Division. Outspoken, impatient, and uncooperative
with subordinates and superiors alike, he is perhaps best remembered
for absconding at the last moment rather than going into captivity
with Thomas, Percival, and the remaining men of his division. This
action of his became the subject of a military court of inquiry and a
Royal Commission in Australia after the war.
It may seem that the attention paid here to senior figures in the
military is misplaced, but that is not the case; indeed, on more than
one occasion I found myself flipping back to the prologue to confirm
that the colonial government was, in fact, intended to be the primary
focus of this book. Even the front cover, with its photographs of two
military men and two civilians, suggests that equal attention will

The photo of Brooke-Popham on the front cover, far left, amply justifies the
“slightly baffled good nature” attributed to him by the writer J.G. Farrell, whose
exhaustively researched historical novel The Singapore Grip (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1978; the quotation is from p. 117) covers the same period as McCrum’s
volume and is highly recommended.
6  
Arthur E. Percival, The War in Malaya (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1949),
24.
7  
In a “secret and personal” letter to Churchill quoted on p. 156.
8  
Ivan Simson, Singapore: Too Little, Too Late; Some Aspects of the Malayan Disaster
in 1942 (London: Leo Cooper, 1970), 69. McCrum purports to be quoting this
passage on p. 176, but comparison with the original reveals a very free paraphrase.
Simson, a brigadier in 1942, was the Chief Engineer in question.
5  
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be devoted to both groups, and it is my impression that that is an
accurate representation of the book’s contents. That is not necessarily
a bad thing, though, particularly for the reader with no prior exposure
to the Malayan campaign. In a more general sense, too, The Men
Who Lost Singapore is a far cry from the sharply focused study
of the civilian leadership announced in the prologue. This becomes
apparent no later than the second chapter, “Harbingers of War,”
where an overview is provided of the strategic situation in the Far
East that includes, among more pertinent information, a comparison
of Japanese rice production figures for 1940 with those from 1868.
Although thoroughness of this sort will undoubtedly be beneficial to
many, what McCrum does here is in some ways akin to beginning
every book on the Second World War in Europe with an overview
of Nazi ideology. In those parts of the book dealing with the actual
fighting, although the author gamely leavens his account (as he does
throughout the work) with such material as extracts from Legislative
Council and War Council minutes, the correspondence, diaries and
private papers of figures such as Thomas and Duff Cooper, and
material from contemporary newspapers, it is nevertheless perhaps
inevitable that military affairs at the strategic, operational, and
even tactical levels should receive the lion’s share of the attention.
The chapter entitled “Aftermath,” primarily covering the period
of Japanese occupation, is technically not even necessary because,
by this time, the “men who lost Singapore” had done their work;
nevertheless, the author gratifyingly ties up loose ends by describing
the fates, both during the occupation and postwar, of many of the
principal figures, including on the Japanese side.
In light of the foregoing, I think it would be fair to describe
this book more as a retelling of the Japanese conquest of Malaya
and Singapore with an emphasis, where applicable, on the actions of
the civilian leadership. If a failure to adhere rigorously to its stated
purpose was its only problem, I would not hesitate to describe this as
an excellent volume. Unfortunately, this book suffers from numerous
difficulties, of which considerations of space oblige me to discuss only
the most pressing. While the author writes very well at the level of
the paragraph, as well as at the level of the entire book, which is
competently organised, what he cannot seem to do is write well at
the level of the chapter. We often see the narrative moving along
briskly for generally anywhere from three to six paragraphs before the
subject matter changes abruptly, usually going back to something said

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol28/iss2/3
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before, without the extra line break between paragraphs customarily
employed to indicate this. Subject headings within chapters, which
likely would have helped to minimise this tendency, are not used.
Time and again, phrases like “as mentioned earlier,” “as we have
learnt,” or “as noted in the previous chapter” appear—a sure sign of
a writer who has trouble organising his or her material. The opposite
problem occurs as well; that is, the author not remembering that he
has given us material previously. For example, we are introduced to
Duff Cooper twice, in two consecutive chapters, in almost identical
language each time. Worse still is the appearance of an identical
block quotation from Duff Cooper’s autobiography twice in the same
chapter.9 Greater diligence on the part of the editorial staff would
have greatly improved McCrum’s manuscript in this regard.
Although published by a university press (NUS is the National
University of Singapore), this book lacks any attempt at an overview
of previous scholarship on its subject, normally de rigueur in
academic writing. However, footnotes and a meticulously compiled
bibliography distinguish this work from the products of the “retired
British colonel” school of military history writing that were once so
common. Certainly, anyone in future doing scholarly work on the
actions of the colonial authorities in Singapore during the Japanese
invasion will need to take into account McCrum’s findings. As for the
more general reader, I have to say that I thoroughly enjoyed reading
this informative book despite its flaws—which may have been due,
at least in part, to a desire to release the book in time for the 75th
anniversary of the surrender. Whatever the case, Colonel McCrum’s
emphasis on the civilian leadership represents an unexpectedly
original approach to a story that has been told many times before,
and for that alone he deserves high marks.
brian bertosa , independent researcher

Both times McCrum has silently omitted a small amount of material appearing
in the original passage. To muddy the waters further, the second time this extract
appears he attributes it to a War Cabinet document in the National Archives, Kew.
I have confirmed that the material is from Duff Cooper’s published autobiography,
therefore I cannot see how the second citation can be correct. These irregularities,
together with the problem mentioned in my previous footnote, do not inspire
confidence in the reliability of the author’s documentation overall.

9  

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2019

5

